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ABSTRACT 
An extensive literature examines how distributive (i.e., “pork barrel”) spending is allocated 
among congressional districts. Much of this research finds evidence that intra-chamber factors 
like ideology, party, and committee membership are the primary determinants of various forms 
of distributive spending. However, we know much less about how extra-chamber factors such as 
district-level demand and the economy impact the distribution of federal outlays. In this study, I 
find that district-level demand and variation in economic factors, in particular, income and 
unemployment, significantly predict the distribution of new bureaucratic awards in the 110th 
Congress. The results support the contention that districts get what they need, and this raises 
questions about the ability of members of powerful committees to steer awards selectively to 
their districts. It also provides evidence for the economic “law of increasing state activity,” by 
which districts with higher income levels receive a larger share of federal assistance.   
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 Introduction  
 An extensive and distinguished literature on federal spending tends to examine its 
distribution based on the pork barrel thesis that powerful members of Congress are able to steer 
funds to their districts based on their positions on powerful committees, seniority, or other 
positions of authority. In recent years, however, some scholars have begun to examine the ways 
in which district-level characteristics that are theoretically linked to specific types of agency 
spending might better explain federal spending patterns. Studies that, for example, include 
examinations of the impact of hazard levels on EPA superfund spending (Hird 1981), the 
concentration of farms on agricultural distribution (Gryzki 1991), the impact of flood damage on 
Corps of Engineers activity (Lazarus 2009), and the allocational characteristics of funds (Lee 
2003) have cast some doubt on the overall strength of the traditional pork barrel thesis.  
This study advances the idea that district-level characteristics, like member-specific traits, 
can also be effective predictors of federal spending. It does so by examining a dataset of new 
federal awards from the 110th Congress and measures their variation against district level 
variables developed by Adler (2002). In the case of federal awards distributed through the 
various federal agencies and bureaucratic divisions, it is reasonable to imagine that constituents 
should get what constituents need. Stein (1981, 341) argued that “rather than relying exclusively 
on a supply-side approach, policy makers might consider the recipients’ perspective.” The 
overreliance on intra-chamber factors has led others to argue that “discretionary grant programs 
are perhaps unlikely places to find strong supply side effects since these awards are made in the 
byways of bureaucracies, insulated to some degree from congressional and presidential political 
pressures” (Lowry and Potoski 2004, 517).  
2 
 
In an attempt to move beyond any narrow focus of political determinants, I attempt to 
situate economic factors more squarely within the literature on distributive spending. Past studies 
have typically treated district-level economic factors like income and unemployment as control 
variables. Yet Wagner’s Law, an economic theory of “increasing state activity,” provides some 
guidance for why income and federal spending may be directly related. Moreover, 
macroeconomic theory offers predictions about the relationship between unemployment and 
federal spending.  
This paper is structured as follows: I begin with a brief review of the federal budget 
process and the broad role Congress is thought to have in it. Second, I review the established 
literature on intra-chamber factors that have been found to influence the distribution of federal 
funds. Third, I review the literature that forms the backbone of my first hypothesis: that measures 
of local demand play a major role in the distribution of federal funds. Fourth, I review the 
empirical work around Wagner’s Law and apply its logic to spending within Congressional 
districts. Fifth, I derive hypotheses based on the scholarly literature reviewed in sections three 
and four. Sixth, I introduce my original dataset of new federal assistance from the 110th 
Congress, specify variables and describe empirical tests. Seventh, I present my results in the 
aggregate model and across 23 separate federal agencies and bureaucratic divisions. Finally, I 
discuss the results and their implications for the study of distributive politics.  
 
I. The Federal Budget 
At $3.6 trillion, the Unites States boasts the largest level of federal expenditure in the 
world. In fact, U.S. federal expenditure for the fiscal year 2009 was greater than the combined 
spending of the world’s second and third biggest spenders, Japan and Germany (The World 
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Factbook 2010). The president has significant amount of power to set the federal spending 
agenda by revealing his budgetary priorities, and Congress has the power to review this budget 
and, through committee action, authorize programs and appropriate funds for bureaucratic 
divisions and federal agencies subsequently to spend (Oleszek 2007, 41). Article 1, Section 8 of 
the U.S. Constitution provides Congress with the power to spend federal funds, and the 16th 
amendment to the Constitution created a federal income tax so that federal programs would be 
sufficiently funded (Kernell and Jacobson 2007, 13 and 190).  
The vast majority of the federal budget — about 70 percent — is reserved for so-called 
“non-discretionary” expenditures: interest on debt, entitlements (social security, Medicare, 
pensions), and defense contracts. These funds are automatically distributed to the federal 
agencies responsible for spending them. The remaining 30 percent is considered “discretionary 
spending” and is allocated among the dozen or so annual appropriations bills. The first step is for 
Congress to create, continue, or alter programs through the authorization process. The second 
step is the appropriations phase, during which federal funds are distributed to the bureaucratic 
divisions and federal agencies responsible for their expenditure. Both stages take place within 
respective committees and subcommittees that maintain jurisdiction over each federal agency’s 
policy area (Oleszek 2007, 40-47; Davidson and Oleszek 2000, 365-370).  
 The U.S. Constitution provides a limited starting point for predicting Congressional 
power over the distribution of federal funds. The so-called “tax and spend clause” grants 
Congress the power to provide “for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United 
States.” Founders of the republic James Madison and Alexander Hamilton had their own 
disagreements over how to interpret the phrase, the former treating it narrowly and the latter 
more broadly. Madison, in Federalist 41, argued that the clause by no means granted Congress 
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autocratic spending powers and that any interpretation of the broad phrase must be contingent on 
particular enumerated powers that would precede it. He defended one particular presidential veto 
of transportation and waterway spending through a strict reading of “general welfare,” claiming 
that such projects provide no “advantage to the general prosperity.” Hamilton, on the other hand, 
sought broader Congressional spending powers, arguing that “whatever concerns the general 
interests of learning, of agriculture, of manufactures, and of commerce are within the sphere of 
the national Councils as far as regards an application of money.” 
 Two centuries after these two political leaders publically hashed out their interpretations 
of such a critical constitutional clause, a large and distinguished scholarly literature has 
contributed substantially to our theoretical and empirical understanding of “who gets what, how 
much, and under what conditions” (Bickers and Stein 1990, 3). The “who” in this study refers to 
the 435 members of the House of Representatives who seek to secure funds for their districts. 
The “how much” refers to the numbers of awards and their associated value. And the 
“conditions” are the variations in the political, economic, and demand-side variables that 
researchers have identified as critical to the study of distributive spending patterns.  
 
II. Supply-Side Theory and Evidence 
The vast majority of scholarship seeking to explain the distribution of federal funds — 
whether earmarks, grants, awards, or other forms of spending — analyzes factors intrinsic to 
Congress. These “supply side” factors include electoral circumstances, committee membership, 
seniority and ideology. The role of distributive policy in the relationship between voters and 
politicians seeking reelection has been a topic of widespread study. Distributive policy, 
according to Lowi (1964), describes those efforts “characterized by the ease with which they can 
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be disaggregated and dispensed unit by small unit … patronage can be taken as a synonym for 
distributive in the fullest meaning of the word” (Frisch 1998, 13, n. 4). This particular definition 
suggests that members of Congress hope to buy loyalty — or votes — through the delivery of 
benefits to their districts. This idea is consistent with the seminal body of scholarship steeped in 
the rational choice tradition. Scholars like Anthony Downs (1957) and Mancur Olson (1965), 
borrowing from economics, applied rational choice theories to the behaviors of parties and 
interest groups (Arnold 2004). Others, notably Fiorina and Meyhew, applied rational choice 
theory to legislative behavior. In his classic work on Congress, Fiorina (1977; 1989, 101-107; 
Frisch 1998, 12) describes member motivations:  
This approach views individuals as the fundamental actors in politics and seeks to explain 
political processes and outcomes as consequences of their purposive behavior. Political 
actors are assumed to have goals and to pursue those goals sensibly and efficiently.… 
individuals have goals appropriate to the institutional positions around which their 
careers are centered. Congressmen are assumed to have a predominant reelection motive. 
 
One of the most oft-cited quotes in any political science literature buttresses this remark, that 
“United States Congressmen [are] single-minded seekers of reelection… establish[ing] an 
accountability relationship with an electorate” (Meyhew 1974, 6-7). More recent research finds 
more direct evidence that members use the promise of federal funds as insurance for reelection. 
Vulnerable members of Congress attempt to acquire more for their districts (Frisch 1998; Lee 
2003; Stein and Bickers 1994), Democrats benefit electorally more so than Republicans (Alvarez 
and Savings 1997), and incumbents can fend off challengers based on their history of delivering 
to their districts (Bickers and Stein 1996). 
Another way in which members seek to use the distribution of benefits is through the 
formation of coalitions during the passage of large general interest omnibus bills. So-called 
“minimum winning coalitions” (“MWC”) are those in which any member belonging to the 
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majority-plus-one-vote side comes out a winner (Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Riker 1962; Riker 
and Ordeshook 1973; Snyder 1991). Yet since such a majority is marginal, it is unstable. In the 
extreme case, all that is required is for a single member to move from one coalition to the other, 
and the prior winning coalition becomes the losing one during the budget cycle. Ferejohn (1974) 
argued that in addition to minimum winning coalitions being unstable, they cannot account for 
the distribution of veto-wielding members or for the agenda-setting power of committees.  
The theory of the MWC contrasts with that of the universalistic coalition, in which every 
member gets at least some benefit he can deliver to his district (Barry 1965; Ferejohn 1974; 
Mayhew 1974, 88-89; Weingast 1979; Shepsle and Weingast 1981). The financial nature of pork 
as an incentive with narrowly targeted benefits and widely distributed costs suggests an 
arrangement that members of Congress and constituents alike might find disagreeable. Yet 
despite that, as a former Appropriations staff director remarked, “an earmark is something that 
flows into 434 congressional districts and not yours. When it comes into your district, it’s a 
federal investment in jobs and education” (Cohn 2006). Thus, universalistic coalition building 
theory reduces the uncertainty of receiving benefits posed by the minimum winning coalition 
approach and increases the likelihood that everyone will get at least something (Evans 2004,  
11-12).  
Members who sit on standing jurisdictional committees are thought to receive more 
benefits for their districts. Distributive theory predicts that so-called “preference outliers” select 
themselves onto committees of interest — in particular, those aligned with the primary concerns 
of their district — and use their post to acquire even larger distributive benefits (Weingast and 
Marshall 1998; Shepsle 1978; Frisch 1998).  
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Partisan theories (Cox and McCubbins 1993 and 1995; Rohde 1989 and 1991) would 
predict that rather than members self-selecting onto committees of interest, parties choose 
committee members from their ranks. Moreover, majority party leaders have been shown to 
influence the placement of specific members on influential committees. As noted above, 
members of the majority party have been found to acquire a larger share of benefits for their 
district than those in the minority party. (Carsey and Rundquist 1999; Balla, Lawrence, 
Maltzman and Sigelman 2002; Lazarus 2009 and 2010). On the other hand, legislators may 
actually refuse pork-barrel projects when voters are strongly attached to their parties (Keefer and 
Khemani 2009).  
A series of studies has found evidence that members of powerful jurisdictional 
committees can exercise control over certain spending within relevant policy areas. (Weingast 
and Marshall 1988; Lee 2003; Cohen, Coval and Malloy 2009; Frisch and Kelly 2007; Lee 2003; 
De Figuerido and Silverman 2006; Lazarus 2008; Masters 1961; Law and Tonon 2006). 
Authorizing committees are charged with approving new and continuing programs, while 
appropriations committees determine federal funding levels across bureaucratic divisions and 
federal agencies. Oleszek (2007, 46-7) summarizes their roles as follows:  
Whether agencies receive the budget authority they request depends in part on the 
recommendations of the authorizing and appropriating committees.… The authorizing 
committees are the policy-making centers on Capitol Hill … and advocate what they 
believe to be the necessary level of appropriations for new and existing federal agencies, 
activities, and programs, specifying either a specific amount of money or an indefinite 
level of funding… Each house’s Appropriations committee and their twelve parallel 
subcommittees recommend how much federal agencies and programs will receive in 
relation to available fiscal resources and economic conditions. The Appropriations 
subcommittee chairs are collectively known in their respective chambers as the ‘College 
of Cardinals’ because of their large influence over spending issues. 
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Yet despite the numerous studies supporting the claim that standing committee members 
are able to steer funds to their districts, Adler (2002, 79) argues that the jury is still out: “Years 
of scholarly work have failed to conclusively establish such a relationship.” Perhaps the evidence 
is mixed because so, too, are the roles that standing committees play. Oleszek (2007, 52) argues 
that “authorizing committees generally support high levels of spending for the programs they 
recommend and seek ways to bypass Appropriations Committee domination… [while] 
appropriating panels often view themselves as guardians of the purse.” Legal scholar Fisher 
(1979, 53) suggests that that “authorization committees have considerable power to force the 
hand of the Appropriations Committees and, in some cases, even to appropriate.”  
The strong theoretical and empirical focus on supply-side factors has provided us with a 
rich understanding of “who gets what, how much, and under what conditions.” Yet for the most 
part, researchers have paid less attention to the roles of district level demand and economic 
factors. Indeed, one congressional analyst recently remarked, “Congress does not directly control 
the level of federal spending that will occur in a particular year” (Oleszek 2007, 45). An 
emerging scholarship has addressed this hole in the literature by testing the impact of carefully 
designed variables that are directly relevant to specific forms of agency spending.  
 
III. Demand-Side Theory and Evidence 
In the halls of Congress or on the campaign trail, it’s not uncommon to hear members 
defend the projects they help steer to their districts. California Democratic Congressman Mike 
Thompson, in defending a military technology project his district received, issued a statement to 
the press, remarking “when I support funding for a local project, it's 100 percent based on the 
benefits it will bring to our district and nothing else” (Payne 2008). The charge from the press 
9 
 
was that Thompson was trading projects for campaign contributions. He was forced to go on the 
defensive. Evidence (see above) suggests that senior members of Congress and members of 
powerful standing committees are able to steer significant amounts of pork to their districts. But 
at the time Thompson defended his earmarks during the 110th Congress, he hardly possessed the 
characteristics of an influential senior member of the House. By 2008, he had served nine years, 
less than the average member tenure of 11 years and far less than that which would be 
considered “senior.” He was not a party leader and did not serve on the powerful Appropriations 
committee. Nor did he sit on the House Armed Services Committee or the Defense 
Appropriations Subcommittee. This anecdotal case suggests that Rep. Thompson may not have 
used positions of power or authority to steer what was considered, by the press at the time, a 
controversial set of defense earmarks valued at nearly $40 million. Perhaps his district just really 
needed the projects. 
It’s reasonable to assume that characteristics of the district should play a large part in 
determining who gets what. Districts with a large share of hospitals might receive a larger share 
of grants through the Department of Health and Human Services. Large cities with populations 
dependent on federal housing assistance might receive a larger share of funds from the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. Congressional districts found across the U.S. 
breadbasket could reasonably be expected to receive their fair share of Department of 
Agriculture awards.  
It is somewhat surprising then that so few empirical studies have tested the impact of 
district demand on the distribution of federal funds. The ones that have, however, have 
significantly contributed to our understanding of distributive policy based on rarely examined 
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factors like constituent/district characteristics, geography, size, economic and demographic 
profiles, and policy demand variables.   
One of the earliest treatments of demand side determinants across a large number of 
policy areas investigated the impact of both local characteristics and committee assignments 
(Gryski 1991). In less than one-third (9 out of 32) of separate tests did jurisdictional 
subcommittee membership positively influence the distribution of federal funds in those policy 
areas. Jurisdictional committee leadership significantly predicted distribution in 34 percent of 
cases (11 out of 32). Yet district-level characteristics were significant more than half the time (70 
out of 128 coefficients). Lazarus (2009), building on Adler’s (2002) analyses of federal outlays, 
examined the impact of local factors on earmarks across a similar number of policy areas and 
found that 13 out of 17 earmarks categories related to at least one measure of local demand. 
Particularly robust results were found for spending in the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, 
and Commerce. 
The influence of powerful committee members over federal spending has been 
challenged by evidence that agencies and their bureaucrats function as “a legitimate fourth force 
in government” (Strauss 1984, 640). An analysis of Commerce and HUD spending demonstrated 
that agency heads were successful in minimizing political manipulation of programs by 
regulating the timing of program announcements, in some cases against the wishes of powerful 
committee members (Anagnoson 1982). Others have found evidence that bureaucratic influence 
can deplete political effects, namely through the ability of agency heads to identify strong 
applicants for federal grants (Gilbert and Specht 1974). More generally, federal assistance at the 
application level before the actual distribution of funds has been found both to reduce overall 
costs and to reduce levels of aid inequalities among districts (Stein 1981). These last two 
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findings — thought different from measures of district demand — suggest that a significant level 
of influence can take place at the administrative level before requests even reach the 
authorizations or appropriations stages. Potoski and Talbert (2000) found that tax-exempt, 
private, and non-governmental organizations had a more significant influence over the 
distribution of discretionary grants than did committee members or agency heads.  
Several studies are entirely devoted to investigating the impact of local characteristics on 
one specific policy area — “partial studies” (Owens and Wade 1984, 404) — rather than across a 
number of agencies. In contrast to some of the findings cited above that found that members of 
the House Armed Services Committee or the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee received 
significantly more benefits for their districts, others have demonstrated that local factors drive 
this distribution. Employment levels and the actual capital expenditure requirements of the 
military also have significant effects on federal awards (Goss 1973; Rundquist, Lee and Rhee 
1996, Hird 1991). With respect to Homeland Security grants, past electoral returns predicted 
some variation in awards, but more significant were local factors with stronger theoretical links 
to the national defense, such as airport traffic and population density (Coats, Karahan and 
Tollison 2006).  
In an important study of the determinants of federal superfund expenditures, Hird (1990) 
found that members of Congress had little influence over the distribution of cleanup funds. 
Rather, a specific measure of public interest — Hazard Ranking System scores — was found to 
be a more significant predictor of fund distribution than, for example, membership on the EPA’s 
authorizing committee or appropriations subcommittee. Interest groups, in addition to the public 
interest, have also been found to influence federal spending while controlling for the various 
supply-side variables so prominent in the pork barrel literature (Lowry and Potoski 2004).  
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IV. Theory and Evidence on the Economy, Wagner’s Law 
The literature on determinants of pork barrel spending tends almost exclusively to focus 
on political factors, and more recently, on measures of local demand. The role of economics is 
rarely investigated. Two questions arise from time to time, but none receive serious treatment in 
the literature. The first asks whether pork barrel projects are economically efficient. That is, do 
they provide a benefit given the cost? Shepsle and Weingast (1981) argue that “because of the 
political basis for calculating benefits and costs, ‘pork,’ in various forms, will always serve as 
part of the legislator’s response to his voters’ retrospective question, ‘What have you done for 
me lately?’ And, consequently, economic inefficiency will likely be a permanent characteristic of 
the distributive policies of legislative institutions” (110). The “benefits and costs” to which the 
authors refer are highly targeted benefits spread over widely distributed costs, which suggests 
that members of Congress don’t care if a project is inefficient. Agencies too, don’t appear to 
consider the true value of a project given their propensity to claim its effectiveness. Evans (2004, 
4) notes  “the readiness with which federal agencies claim that a project’s benefits equal or 
exceed its costs highlights the practical difficulties of making judgments about project efficiency 
in any case.”  
A second question asks whether economic factors are thought to influence the 
distribution of pork barrel projects specifically, and federal spending in general. Frisch (1998, 
85-86) develops a general model of earmark spending in which he hypothesizes that distressed 
districts will receive more earmarks than affluent ones. Specifically, he argues that “low income 
districts would be more likely to receive earmarks than wealthier districts, as poor districts have 
greater need for the economic development that can be associated with government spending.” 
Others have found little evidence that distressed districts receive more earmarks (Boyle and 
13 
 
Matheson 2009). Another view holds that increasing real incomes in U.S. Model Cities during 
the 1960s led to more projects because higher tax revenues could be used to pay for more 
services (Friedan and Kaplan 1987). Yet it appears true, as Lazarus (2009, 351) suggests, that 
“no prior theoretical treatment points to [why economic factors can influence earmark 
distribution].”  
One way to address this theoretical gap would be through the application of Wagner’s 
Law to distributive spending. The law, which reverses the Keynesian causal arrow (government 
spending leads to increases in income), is based on the ideas of 19th-century German economist 
Adolph Wagner and his so-called “law of increasing state activity” (Peacock and Scott 2000, 1). 
He predicted that there existed a long-run relationship between growth in national income and 
growth in government expenditures. He reasoned that as income went up, public sectors 
experienced relative growth, which was associated with advances in technology, the growth of 
political institutions, and increased political participation. Government needed to expand its 
fiscal participation in response to these trends and expand its fiscal role due to the increasingly 
complex and administrative functions it would have to assume (Bickers 1991). Moreover, greater 
urbanization and population growth would require more public spending. Wagner also assumed 
that the private sector would not be able to keep up with consistent and increasing levels of 
growth, and so, the government would have to fill in the gaps (Mann 1981; Thornton 1999).   
Wagner’s theory also assumes that the demand for public goods is income elastic, and 
therefore, as income grows, so too does state expansion, which is typically modeled as 
government expenditure (Burney and Al-Mussallam 1999). The simplest model of Wagner’s law 
regresses some measure of government expenditure on some measure of income. Early 
applications of the theory included population-based variables because Wagner also assumed 
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that growth in population, as noted above, would also lead to growth in expenditure (Kyzrzaniak 
2001). Since the time of Wagner, the “tendency for the public sector to grow relative to national 
income has become widely accepted as a stylized fact in public finance” (Henrekson 1993, 1; 
Islam 2001, 509).  
One immediate complication that follows from Wagner’s theory is how to define the 
dependent variable: government expenditure. Basic macroeconomic theory informs us that a 
nation’s gross domestic product has five major components: consumption, investment, 
government spending, exports, and imports. We are interested in the third component, 
government spending, which itself is one of two components — along with taxes — that make 
up a nation’s fiscal policy (Blanchard 2000, 42-46).  
Wagner himself did not limit his definition of government spending to the national level. 
In articulating his theory, he was careful to account for central government expenditure, local 
government expenditure, and public enterprises (Peacock and Scott 2000). In a review of more 
than a dozen studies on applications of Wagner’s Law, Peacock and Scott (2000, 2) show that 
there is little consensus regarding how to operationalize expenditure. The authors note “there are 
at least 14 different measures of [expenditure] ranging from very narrow definitions such as 
those excluding transfers or excluding defense expenditure to wider definitions where all 
expenditure found in the national accounts are included.” More bluntly, Mann (1981, 189) argues 
“the empirical testing of [Wagner’s] hypothesis is difficult, for it is not certain exactly what is to 
be tested.” Thus, Wagner’s theory leaves room for some interpretation of the dependent variable, 
which in this paper is operationalized as new federal assistance awards.  
Wagner was careful to include local government expenditure in his definition (Peacock 
and Scott 2000). New federal awards distributed at the level of the Congressional district are a 
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variant of funds provided “by the Congress for projects, programs, or grants” (OMB 2009) 
within local districts or states. The history of distributive spending suggests that Wagner himself 
might have been familiar with distributive spending. Were he to follow American economic 
development during his lifetime, he would have known that “pork barrel and distributive policy 
dates from the earliest days of the [American] republic … [when] policies consisted mainly of 
projects of physical improvements such as lighthouses, roads, and canals, dams and harbors” 
(Evans 2004, 4). 
Since Wagner’s writings were translated from German to English in the 1950s, there have 
been hundreds of studies testing the effects of income growth on government expenditure. Most 
of them test the effects of income growth on government expenditure in developing countries, 
but in recent years, many political economy scholars have applied principles of Wagner’s law to 
the United States in general, and to specific states in particular.  
The impact of income on expenditure has been found to be strong in the island nations of 
the Caribbean as well as in Fiji. In a test of nine Caribbean nations, the effect was significant 
(Legrenzi 2004). In a study of Fiji, Granger causality estimates validated the relationship as well, 
but the authors caution that higher debt levels lead to decreased explanatory strength, since 
increasing levels of national income are devoted to debt financing, rather than expenditure 
programs (Narayan 2008). The Mexican economy appears to have followed Wagner’s Law 
during more than 50 years of mid-century expansion (Mann, 1980), as it did for a large sample of 
nations at similar levels of economic development. Despite this, the relationship was weak for 
very poor and very wealthy nations, suggesting that the law might only apply to a specific level 
of post-industrial development (Abizadeh and Gray 1985).  
A review of the European countries has shown that the law has particularly strong 
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explanatory power for many developed countries on the continent. The evidence is mixed for the 
less developed nations like Greece and Portugal (Courakis, Moura-Roque and Tridimas 1993). In 
a study of the law at the industry level in Greece, the law was found only to apply to the defense 
industry (Chletsos and Collias 1997).  
In historical and more contemporary tests of the United Kingdom, the law was found to 
have strong explanatory power. One author found that “unidirectional causality ran from income 
to public expenditure … [which provides] unambiguous support for Wagner’s Law … for Britain 
during the period 1870-1913” (Oxley 1994, 295). Gyles (1991; also see Chang 2002; Chang Lui 
and Caudill 2004) demonstrated that in the UK, Wagner’s Law is highly significant as an input-
output mechanism. A study of six nations in 19th century Europe showed that “Granger-causality 
was mainly unidirectional from income to government expenditure. Thus, there is considerable 
support for Wagner’s Law” (Thornton 1999, 416). Finally, Wahab (2004) observed the presence 
of Wagner’s Law in the OECD countries was strong in periods of accelerating national income 
(also see Kolluri 2000).  
Until this point, it may appear to be pure conjecture to apply the principles of Wagner’s 
Law to any study of the United States. Yet, a few scholars have demonstrated its validity at the 
national and state levels. In a comparative study of four Asian nations, plus the UK and U.S., 
strong support was found for the validity of Wagner’s law in five of those nations studied, with 
the exception of Thailand (Chang 2002; Chang Lui and Caudill 2004). The United States has 
also been studied in a non-comparative model, and strong support for Wagner’s Law was found. 
(Islam 2001). In justifying the application of the law at the state level, Abizadeh and Yousefi 
(1988) argue that since Wagner himself assumed that his “law” applied to peaceful nations with 
generally homogeneous cultural and institutional characteristics, then the theory could be applied 
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to the American states. Indeed, they find that increases in income do lead to even larger increases 
in public expenditure in a study of a dozen states.  
 
Unemployment 
While Wagner’s Law provides theoretical justification for the inclusion of income in a 
model of distributive politics, macroeconomic theory provides some justification for also 
including unemployment. Assume that an increase in unemployment could lead to members of 
Congress increasing their requests for projects in order to shore up the lot of the jobless in their 
districts. The economic logic is that rising unemployment places downward pressure on wages 
since unemployed workers have less bargaining power than employed workers. This relationship 
is captured in the nominal wage determination,  
W = PeF(u, z) 
where W = wages; Pe = expected prices; u = unemployment, inversely related to wages; and z = 
all other variables, positively related to wages (Blanchard 2000, 114). As wages decline in 
environments of high unemployment, when consumers have less disposable income, firms face 
reductions in output. Lower output levels and the costs associated with holding excess inventory 
causes downward pressure on prices, and in the end, profits. This description, in large part, 
echoes the economic environment occurring during the U.S. recession that took hold in 2008. 
Given these conditions, one might conclude that members of Congress would be tempted to dole 
out earmarks to those businesses and organizations suffering during the economic slump. In this 
case, then, rising unemployment might lead to district level increases in federal funding. Such 
logic would be consistent with the fiscal stimulus hypothesis, in which weak economic 
conditions could help explain pork barrel spending (Frisch 1998; Martin 2003). 
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V. Hypotheses 
This paper has three main hypotheses of interest. The first is drawn from the premise that 
characteristics of the district should be considered alongside intra-chamber political factors in 
determining who gets a certain class of federal awards and how much. For example, a district 
with more farm acreage and rural land is expected to receive more new awards and a greater 
share of Department of Agriculture funding than a district that is, for example, primarily urban. 
Similarly, a district with a greater than average percentage of blue collar workers or members of 
a union would be expected to receive more awards in both count and value from the Department 
of Labor. Table 4 (below) contains the predicted direction for each of the district-level variables 
and the actual results. 
 The second hypothesis centers on income effects. The income effects predicted by 
Wagner’s Law are frequently tested in the economics literature. Based on the theoretical analysis 
outlined above, districts with higher median income levels are expected to receive a larger share 
of government spending. Higher median incomes lead to growth in the public sector and 
associated advances in technology. At some juncture, it is the role of government to increase its 
participation in this relative growth by expanding its administrative functions as indicated by a 
rise in federal spending. Thus, districts with larger per capita income would receive both a 
greater number of new awards in addition to more aggregate funding. 
 The third variable of interest in unemployment. As unemployment rises, corporate output 
declines and districts are expected to receive more projects in order to make up for lost 
production. Frisch (1998) too argues that high levels of unemployment can lead to increases in 
pork barrel spending. Thus, I expect to see the number and value of projects rise as a response to 
rising levels of unemployment.  
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 My primary controls are the political variables that research has shown significantly 
impact the distribution of various types of federal funds. Prior vote share has been shown to 
influence spending in a variety of ways, from award type (Lazarus and Reilly 2009), to shares 
accruing to vulnerable members (Martin 2003; Stein and Bickers 1994; Lazarus 2008), to 
benefits for political parties (Levitt and Snyder 1995; Keefer and Khemani 2009). Members of 
the Democratic Party and more liberal members of Congress are expected to deliver more federal 
money to their districts than are Republicans or conservatives. Members of the majority party 
have been shown to use their majority party status to overcome collective action issues in order 
to direct benefits to their districts (Cox and McCubbins 1991 and 1995; Levitt and Snyder 1995; 
Bickers and Stein 2000). Members who hold powerful leadership posts, such as those on relevant 
authorizing and appropriating subcommittees, are expected to receive more funding for their 
districts (Carsey and Rundquist 1999, Rundquist and Carsey 2002, Adler 2002; Arnold 1979). I 
add a number of additional committee positions as controls, such as membership on Rules, 
Budget, Ways and Means, and Appropriations. More senior members of Congress and members 
of the prestigious “Cardinals” coterie should also be able to deliver more pork to their districts 
than non-members. An exception to this hypothesis is that some powerful Cardinals may be able 
to force members to relinquish awards (Savage 1991). Finally, districts with larger land area 
should receive more awards because new assistance projects, like earmarks, are well suited for 
large geographic areas (Frisch 1998; Gryzki 1991; Lazarus 2009).   
 
VI. Data, Variables and Empirical Model 
The focus of this study is to measure the effects of variation in demand side variables and 
select economic factors on the distribution of new federal grants and awards. The dependent 
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variable is operationalized twice: once as a district-level count of new federal awards, and again 
as a district-level aggregate dollar value of new awards. The unit of analysis is the U.S House 
district and the sample size is 435 for the total number of districts. This analysis proceeds in two 
parts. First, I estimate a single model in which I test the impact of political and economic factors 
on distributive spending within a single model. Next, I separate the data into 23 separate federal 
agencies and bureaucratic divisions and for each category test the impact of characteristics of 
local demand, in addition to the political and economic variables tested in the single model.  
Data on these awards are drawn from the Federal Assistance Award Data System 
(FAADS). The system represented a sea change in financial accountability, as reporting of such 
awards up until 1981 was conducted with paper and film and were often hard to track down. 
Weissert (1981, 76) summarized the new data collection effort at the time: “The FAADS system 
is an outgrowth of an aid information study under the Federal Program Information Act which 
requires the executive branch to improve distribution of federal assistance information … the 
Office of Management and Budget provides policy oversight and guidance for the development 
and implementation of FAADS” (See Bickers and Stein 1991 for a comprehensive review of the 
history of federal record keeping).   
For the 2008 fiscal year, these data covered more than 600 separate programs across 
thirty-three departments and agencies. The entire FAADS database includes itemizations for 1.5 
million awards valued at $3 trillion dollars. Awards can be for single Congressional districts or 
spread across multiple districts. More than half of awards and 40 percent of the total value of 
awards went to single districts. The data can be aggregated a number of ways, but perhaps the 
most important breakdown, besides by Congressional district or agency, is by the type of award.  
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FAADS award type is classified in one of four ways: (1) as a new assistance action; (2) 
as a continuation from a previous award; (3) as a revision, representing a change in funding; or 
(4) as a funding adjustment to an already completed project. In the 2008 fiscal year, there were 
531,000 new awards – about one-third of the total awards – valued at $262 billion. Table 1 
provides a summary of new award counts and values across the 23 agencies and divisions 
studied in this paper. The table also includes jurisdictional authorizing committees and 
appropriations subcommittees for each agency.  
  
Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables 
Dependent Variables Mean Min Max SD 
FAADS counts 1,222 149 6240 893 
FAADS dollars $600,000,000 $57,578,270 $9,445,000,000 $660,000,000 
Independent Variables     
Prior Vote — Democrat .397 0 1 .387 
Prior Vote — Republican .294 0 1 .323226 
Democrat — 0 1 — 
NOMINATE .016062 -.73 .999 .438557 
District Ideology 49.3057 21 90 14.2579 
Party Leader — 0 1 — 
Appropriations — 0 1 — 
Ways & Means — 0 1 — 
Budget — 0 1 — 
Rules — 0 1 — 
Committee Chair — 0 1 — 
Majority Party Cardinal — 0 1 — 
Minority Party Cardinal — 0 1 — 
Seniority 11.1 1 52 8.4 
Income $43,437 $19,311 $80,397 $10,939 
Unemployment 2.81 1.24 6.76 .86 
Land Area 8,335 12 663,267 34,411 
 
Bickers and Stein (1994; also see Lowi 1964) argue that scholars should use new, not 
existing, awards in studies of distributive politics. A new award “is an indicator of the flow of 
resource commitments by the federal government” (Bickers and Stein 2004, 810). There is some 
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debate over the merits of using dollar values in addition to counts. Bickers and Stein (1994, 394) 
argue that in the mind of an election-seeking member of Congress, the ability to deliver many 
new awards of lesser value is more important than a small number of large awards. That it is “the 
occurrence of an award not its dollar size that is usually salient to constituents” is challenged by 
Alvarez and Saving (1997, 815). They argue that voters “would prefer a program in their district 
with a large dollar amount to a program with a small dollar amount.” I thus employ a dependent 
variable that measures the total value of new district level awards, in addition to the number of 
awards (see also Adler 2002 for the use of dollars as a dependent variable).  
As noted above, not all federal awards go to single districts. Of the 435 Congressional 
districts, 273 received single-district awards, while in 162 districts, awards were distributed in an 
unspecified manner. This method of distribution leaves open the possibility of error in each of 
the two dependent variables. Bickers and Stein (1991) address this error by distributing such 
awards (coded “90” by FAADS) according to county-level population data. That approach, while 
useful, requires data collection and assimilation resources that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
To address this issue, I evenly distributed multiple-district awards across each district within a 
state. An alternative to this approach would be to run each test with a sample size equal to 273. 
While such an approach might generate conclusions about federal funding within a segment of 
Congress, it makes it hard to draw conclusions about the entire institution.  
Independent variables of interest are drawn from Lazurus’s (2009) dataset used in his 
study of the effects of district level demand on earmark distribution during the 2008 fiscal year 
of the 110th Congress (see also Adler 2002). That study investigated effects across 16 different 
federal agencies. This study includes most of those agencies, in addition to a few more for a total 
of 23 separate tests. For the most part, I was able to use the same existing data and test its effects 
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against distributions that theoretically might be impacted by similar levels of local demand. For 
example, my study includes a number of military departments – Navy, Army, Air Force – that 
were not included in Lazarus. So for example, levels of local demand used in the estimate of 
Army awards are also used for the three other departments of the military. On at least a few 
occasions, I developed new independent variables for authorizing committees and appropriations 
subcommittees that were not included in Lazarus’ study of earmarks. An example of this is the 
authorizing committee for the Department of Homeland Security.  
I add variables for median income to test the effects of Wagner’s Law and employment to 
test whether district-level joblessness results in members of Congress creating new programs in 
an effort to generate jobs. Both economic variables are drawn from the annual American 
Community Survey, which collects national data for the Census on non-decennial years.  
Control variables include measures of electoral vulnerability, ideology, seniority, 
committee membership, party, and leadership. Existing theories of pork barrel politics and 
logrolling predict that increases in or the presence of these measures results in home districts 
receiving a larger number of awards or more awards. The first aggregate model of counts and 
dollars will include political and economic predictors to account for demand for government 
spending, broadly construed.  
 
Aggregate model (Table 3):  
New Awards = f (Democratic vote share, Republican vote share, party, district ideology, 
party leader, authorizing committee, appropriations subcommittee, Appropriations, Ways & 
Means, Budget, Rules, committee chair, major Cardinal, minor Cardinal, seniority, income, 
unemployment, land area) 
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Demand-side variables added to aggregate model (demand-side results reported in Table 4):  
New Awards = f (variables from aggregate model + 1st demand-side variable, 2nd 
demand-side variable (if applicable) and 3rd demand-side variable (if applicable)) 
 
All estimations of the number of new awards are performed using negative binomial 
regression with robust standard errors. Histograms of the dependent variable reveal 
overdispersion parameters greater than zero, rendering NBR the appropriate estimation method 
for counts (Lowry and Potoski 2004; Lazarus 2009). All estimations of the value of new awards 
are performed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with a logged dependent variable 
(Achen 2000, Martin 2003, Lowry and Potoski 2004; Lazarus 2009).   
 
VII. Empirical Results 
Summary statistics for dependent and independent variables are found in Table 1, above. 
In Table 2, each federal agency or bureaucratic division is followed by summary data about new  
FAADS awards in addition to the relevant jurisdictional committees that are included in unique 
estimations across the separate agencies. Three agencies — HUD, Agriculture, and HHS — 
received more than 100,000 new federal assistance awards for FY 2008. These three agencies, 
along with Transportation and Education, received awards totaling more than $10 billion. The 
Department of Education was the only agency with an average award exceeding $2 million. Four 
other agencies — Labor, Transportation, Commerce and the Army — received awards averaging 
more than $1 million each.  
The regression in Table 3 presents results (with robust standard errors in parentheses) of 
the aggregate test of intra-chamber and economic variables. Columns 2 and 4 include all 
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Table 2 
Agencies, Awards, and Committee Jurisdiction, FY 2008 
FAADS Jurisdictional Committees Agency / 
Division / 
Department 
Number of 
New Awards 
Value of New 
Awards ($) 
Avg. Award 
Value ($) 
Authorizing 
Committee 
Appropriations 
Subcommittee 
HUD 141,166 38,827,114,698 275,046 Finance Transportation 
Agriculture 138,744 71,565,552,427 515,810 Agriculture Agriculture 
HHS 137,445 58,406,268,709 424,943 Energy & Commerce Labor 
Transportation 32,383 47,660,078,178 1,471,762 Transportation Transportation 
NSF 12,746 2,394,351,783 187,851 Science CJS 
Education 8,363 18,701,424,829 2,236,210 Education & Labor Labor 
Interior 7,879 2,185,686,147 277,407 Natural Resources Interior 
DHS 5,502 4,325,792,927 786,222 Homeland Security  Homeland Security 
Justice 5,345 2,641,631,625 494,225 Judiciary  CJS 
Arts-related 3,574 1,187,921,256 332,379 Education & Labor Labor 
EPA 2,074 2,044,592,386 985,821 Science CJS 
Commerce 1,832 2,278,391,056 1,243,663 Energy & Commerce CJS 
Labor 1,599 2,875,276,439 1,798,172 Education & Labor Labor 
Energy 1,141 1,036,870,069 908,738 Energy & Commerce Energy 
Army 1,035 1,123,037,493 1,085,060 Armed Forces Defense 
Navy 989 287,266,935 290,462 Armed Forces Defense 
Air Force 980 143,247,037 146,170 Armed Forces Defense 
NASA 766 57,873,665 75,553 Science CJS 
Defense 598 97,554,399 163,134 Armed Forces Defense 
National Service 501 142,341,625 284,115 Education & Labor Labor 
Small Business 220 179,125,127 814,205 Finance Finance 
Treasury 168 8,504,393 50,621 Finance Finance 
Army Corps 121 43,754,510 361,608 Transportation Transportation 
Not tested 26,274 3,952,839,119 150,447 — — 
Totals: 531,418 262,166,496,832 493,334 — — 
 
coefficients for counts and dollars, respectively. Neither is directly interpretable because 
negative binomial regression was used to estimate counts, and the dependent variable for dollars 
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is logged. Substantive effects are estimated through the use of Clarify software (Tomz, et al. 
2001) and are represented in Figures 1-11. 
The results for the effects of changes in income suggest that Wagner’s Law of 
“increasing state activity” is supported for the distribution of dollars but not of counts. This is the 
expected result, since past empirical tests almost universally test the predictive power of 
Wagner’s law on the expenditure of dollars, not the growth in projects. For dollars, districts with 
higher incomes receive more total dollars, as increasing income one standard deviation above the 
mean results in $81 million more in new federal assistance. For counts, an increase in one 
standard deviation above mean district income results in a decline of about 34 new awards per 
district, all else equal. The relationship is monotonic but possibly non-linear, as adding a 
quadratic control for income results in a null relationship between income and counts. Adding a 
quadratic control for income to this estimation reveals that Wagner’s Law may have some 
explanatory power — to a point. Because the coefficient for the quadratic is negative instead of 
positive, there exists the possibility that beyond a certain point, it is no longer politically 
expedient to fund increasingly wealthy districts, despite the developmental need. 
The estimation of counts reveals that districts with higher levels of unemployment also 
receive fewer new assistance awards — 22 fewer, all else equal. This result runs contrary to the 
fiscal stimulus hypothesis that districts in need of jobs-generating stimulus will receive more 
awards. On the other hand, the estimation of dollars does support the fiscal stimulus hypothesis. 
In this case, an increase of one standard deviation from the mean results in $58 million more in  
new federal assistance for the district. The finding suggests that dollars may be a more important 
indicator of economic stimulus than project counts. Taken together, districts with higher incomes 
and higher unemployment receive fewer awards, but more dollars.  
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Table 3 
Negative Binomial Regression Results for New FAADS Award Counts and  
OLS Regression Results for New FAADS Award Dollars, FY 2008 
Independent Variable Number of awards Dollar Value of Awards 
Prior Vote — Democrat .774* (.276) 
.924* 
(.329) 
Prior Vote — Republican .034  (.339) 
.075   
(.563) 
Democrat -.759* (.324) 
 -.469 
(.429) 
NOMINATE -.665* (.220) 
-.207 
(.215)   
District Ideology -.003 (.004) 
-.011 
(.004)   
Party Leader -.122 (.120) 
-.020 
(.124) 
Appropriations -.022 (.077) 
 -.002 
(.075) 
Ways & Means -.024 (.087) 
-.043 
(.105) 
Budget -.108 (.083) 
-.171 
(.103)    
Rules -.118 (.129) 
 .082 
(.090) 
Committee Chair .015 (.120) 
 -.163 
(.156) 
Majority Party Cardinal .271 (.258) 
-.035 
(.206) 
Minority Party Cardinal -.004 (.128) 
-.106 
(.199) 
Seniority -.003 (.004) 
 -.001 
(.004) 
Income -9.36e-06* (3.27e-06) 
.00001* 
(2.94e-06) 
Unemployment -.147* (.041) 
 .102* 
(.039)   
Land Area .212* (.024) 
.066* 
(.020) 
Constant 6.559* (.615) 
19.140* 
(.569) 
N 435 435 
Pseudo R2 .04 — 
R2 — .09 
Log Pseudolikelihood -3,299 — 
Wald χ2 450 — 
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The results reveal that a number of political factors heavily influence the distribution of 
counts and to a lesser extent, dollars. Democrats with higher vote share during the previous 
election were able to acquire more benefits for their districts — both in terms of counts and 
dollars. A one standard deviation increase in prior vote share for Democrats translated into 550 
extra awards and $180 million. No such effects were found for Republican prior vote share. This 
result is contrary to a body of evidence suggesting that vulnerable members tend to acquire  
greater benefits for the districts (Stein and Bickers 1994 and 1996; Levitt and Snyder 1997; 
Lazarus 2009; Lazarus and Reilly 2010). On the other hand, it may be true that during the 110th 
Congress, districts that delivered strong results for Democrats were rewarded with new federal 
assistance. Voters did, in fact, give Democrats a majority in both the House and the Senate (by 
caucusing with Independents) for the first time since the end of the 103rd Congress in 1995.  
As predicted, liberal members (those with increasingly negative NOMINATE scores) 
received more awards than more conservative members. A one standard deviation decrease from 
the chamber’s mean NOMINATE score is associated with an increase in new awards by 392. 
Members of the Democratic Party appear to receive fewer awards — 453 as the code moves 
from 0 for Republicans to 1 for Democrats. Districts in which John Kerry received a higher vote 
share in 2004 received $48 million less in new federal assistance, all else equal.  
 The most surprising finding is the absence of significant committee membership effects 
in the controls for all standing and jurisdictional committee posts. Neither party leaders, nor 
powerful committee members, nor chairmen, nor Cardinals, nor senior members of Congress can 
be shown, by virtue of their jurisdictional standing, significantly to impact the distribution of 
new federal awards for their district. These results, as later tests show, are consistent across 
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Figures 1-6 
Substantive Effects of Significant Independent Variables on FAADS Counts 
Figure 1  
Prior Democratic Vote 
Figure 2 
Democratic Party Membership (1 = Democrat) 
 
 
Figure 3  
Ideology (NOMINATE) 
Figure 4 
Income 
  
Figure 5 
Unemployment (%) 
Figure 6 
District Size (Logged Square Miles) 
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Figures 7-11 
Substantive Effects of Significant Independent Variables on FAADS Dollars ($000,000) 
Figure 7 
Prior Democratic Vote 
Figure 8 
District Ideology 
  
Figure 9 
Income 
Figure 10 
Unemployment (%) 
  
Figure 11 
District Size (Logged Square Miles) 
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virtually all agencies with the exception of a few cases. The results are somewhat at odds with 
the standard pork barrel thesis that powerful politicians take advantage of their assignments in 
order to steer funds to their districts and supports the emerging view that other factors matter 
(Owens and Wade 1984). 
 A final variable demonstrates highly consistent significant effects for land area. In the 
case of both counts and dollars, larger districts get more. A one standard deviation increase in 
logged land area corresponds with 380 more new awards in terms of counts and $89 million in 
terms of dollars. Frisch (1998) argues that earmarks — a separate though related form of 
distributive spending — “involve projects suited to large geographic areas.” Land area was 
logged to minimize the possibility of skew effects from large states, and separate tests removing  
the congressional district from Alaska (largest state; 18 percent of total U.S. territory) do not 
impact levels of significance in the original aggregate estimations of counts or dollars. The 
significant findings with respect to land area are consistent with several empirical tests of 
earmark distribution in the House (Frisch 1998; Gryzki 1991; Lazarus 2009).  
 
Effects across Federal Agencies and Bureaucratic Divisions 
Table 4 presents the results of 23 separate tests of district level demand across nearly all 
agencies and divisions present in the FY 2008 FAADS database. Counts and dollars across 
districts are regressed on the same variables found in Table 3 with the addition of one to three 
demand-side variables for each agency. Each agency, its associated demand-side variables and 
expected coefficient direction are listed in columns 1-3. The first expected direction refers to the 
hypothesis that counts will increase along with larger values of demand-side variables, while the 
second expected direction refers to the expected changes in dollars. All hypothesized directions 
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are positive. Substantive effects for select hypothesized relationships are included in Table 5, 
below. 
 The last column presents the results of 23 separate estimations including all relevant 
variables. As noted above, independent variables are drawn from Adler (2002) and Lazarus 
(2009). The entire model reveals significant relationships in more than one-third of total cases — 
21 out of 56 for both counts and dollars. That is, the model of both counts and dollars included 
56 demand-side variables across the 23 agencies and in 21 cases, the effect was positive and 
significant. Both significant and non-significant signs are reported in Table 4, with significant 
outcomes denoted with an asterisk. The most robust results in which at least half of hypothesized 
indicators are significant and positive occurred for HUD, HHS, NSF, Interior, the  
arts, Labor, Energy, and Treasury. Results were positive and significant for both counts and 
dollars for 12 separate demand-level indicators. In a number of cases, the same indicators that 
correlate with the distribution of the number of earmarks (Lazarus 2009) also correlate with the 
distribution of the number of new federal assistance awards. They are HUD (population density), 
Agriculture (rural population), Energy (has research university), Interior (parks area), and 
Commerce (has research university and borders ocean).    
As was the case with aggregate model, increases in income are strongly correlated with 
the distribution of new dollars, consistent with the predictions of Wagner’s Law. In 17 out of 23 
agencies, income is positively correlated with new award dollars. Income and counts are 
positively correlated in 7 of 23 agencies. The most robust results, in which both dollars and 
counts are greater in districts with higher incomes occur for HHS, NSF, Education, the arts, 
Commerce, Energy, and the Navy.  
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Table 4 
Agencies and Associated Characteristics of District Demand 
Predicted and Actual Results 
Agency / Department District Demand Indicator Description Predicted Result1 
Actual  
Result2 
Population density + / + +* / +* 
% of residents living in urban areas + / + -* / +* 
Housing and Urban 
Development, 
Department of Dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities + / + -* / -* 
% of residents employed in farming, fishing 
and wildlife + / + + / + Agriculture, Department 
of 
% of residents living in rural areas + / + +* / + 
% of population employed in health care + / + +* / +*  Health and Human 
Services, Department of # of hospitals in district + / + - / + 
% of population employed in transportation 
and public utilities + / + + / + Transportation, 
Department of 
% of population employed in construction + / + - / - 
% of population who are students + / + +* / +* 
Dummy: district has a research university + / + +* / +* National Science Foundation 
% of population who are scientists + / + + / + 
% of population who are students + / + +* / + 
Dummy: district has a research university + / + + / + Education, Department of 
Number of major universities + / + + / + 
Population density + / + +* / + 
# of national parks (by state) + / + -* / + Interior, Department of 
the acreage managed by Bureau of Land 
Management (by state) + / + +* / +* 
population density + / + +* / + 
% of residents living in urban areas + / + + / +* Justice, Department of 
dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities + / + -* / + 
population density + / + + / + 
% of residents living in urban areas + / + +* / + Homeland Security, Department of 
dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities + / + -* / + 
dummy: district has a research university + / + +* / +* 
population density + / + +* / +* Library Sciences, Arts, Humanities, etc. 
% of residents who are students + / + + / + 
dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities + / + + / +* Environmental 
Protection Agency population density + / + + / +* 
dummy: district has a research university + / + +* / +* Commerce, Department 
of dummy: district boarders an ocean + / + +* / +* 
% of population employed in blue collar 
professions + / + +* / +* Labor, Department of 
% of population belonging to a union + / + -* / -* 
Energy, Department of 
 
 
 
dummy: district has a research university + / + +* / +* 
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Table 4 
Agencies and Associated Characteristics of District Demand 
Predicted and Actual Results 
Agency / Department District Demand Indicator Description Predicted Result1 
Actual  
Result2 
# of military installations in district + / + + / +* 
# of major military installations in district + / + +* / + Army, Department of the 
% of population in the military (noncivilian) 
workforce + / + + / + 
# of military installations in district + / + + / + 
# of major military installations in district + / + + / + Navy, Department of the  
% of population in the military (noncivilian) 
workforce + / + + / +* 
# of military installations in district + / + + / + 
# of major military installations in district + / + + / - Air Force, Department of 
% of population in the military (noncivilian) 
workforce + / + + / + 
National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration 
dummy: district contains a NASA 
installation + / + +* / + 
# of military installations in district + / + + / + 
# of major military installations in district + / + +  + Defense, Department of 
% of population in the military (noncivilian) 
workforce + / + + / + 
population density + / + + / + 
% of residents living in urban areas + / + - / + Corporation for National and Community Service 
dummy: district is in one of 50 biggest cities + / + + / +* 
size of the state's banking assets + / + + / + 
Small Business 
Administration % of population employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate + / + + / +* 
size of the state's banking assets + / + +* / + 
Treasury, Department of 
the % of population employed in finance, 
insurance, and real estate + / + +* / +* 
dollars of damage caused by floods (10-year 
average, by state) + / + + / +* U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers dollars of flood damage prevented (10-year 
average, by state) + / + + / + 
Notes: 
1 Predicted results indicate counts first and dollars second.  
2 Actual results indicate counts first and dollars second. All coefficient directions are noted. Only significant 
directions are represented with asterisk.   
* — Significant at p < .05. 
 
Higher unemployment levels are significantly correlated with more dollars in 10 
agencies, lending support to the fiscal stimulus hypothesis. We know from the aggregate model 
that districts with higher unemployment receive a smaller number of awards and this is also true 
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for counts for six agencies — the National Science Foundation, Labor, the Army, NASA, the 
Department of Defense, and the Corporation for National and Community Service.  
Political variables that significantly predicted the distribution of counts and dollars are 
significant across several agencies. In three categories of agency awards — HUD, HHS, and the 
Army — higher incumbent vote percentages for Democrats result in greater award counts and 
dollars. This is true across seven agencies for counts and 11 agencies for dollars. Another 
consistently significant variable is member ideology, where more liberal members secure more 
benefits. Consistent with the aggregate model, this is much more frequently the case for counts 
than for dollars. Also consistent with the aggregate model is that Democrats are likely to receive 
fewer awards than Republicans, likely because of the colinearity between the party and ideology 
variables.   
Membership on standing committees, seniority, and leadership roles are rarely significant 
across the 23 agencies tested, consistent with the aggregate model, but contrary to a great deal of 
existing empirical evidence. A surprising result is that membership on the powerful 
Appropriations committee is significant in only two out of 46 tests (23 tests each for counts and 
dollars), and in both cases the coefficient is in the wrong hypothesized direction. This is similar 
with membership on Ways and Means and on Budget. Also contrary to a great deal of empirical 
evidence is the incredibly weak predictive power of membership on Authorizing committees and 
Appropriations subcommittees. Members of these committees are thought to influence program 
creation and funding levels significantly, but only in a handful of cases does this appear to be the 
case. Only membership on the authorizing committee for Agriculture appears to impact the 
distribution of new agriculture awards. Membership on Appropriations subcommittees appears to 
matter only in the cases of arts programs, NASA, community service, and the Army Corps of 
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Engineers. These programs receive neither a large number of awards nor a large aggregate value 
of awards.  
As expected, larger districts receive more awards and more dollars. The scope of this 
result is impressive, occurring in 19 agencies for counts and 12 agencies for dollars.  
 
VIII. Discussion 
 The gains-from-exchange model of distributive theory argues that members of standing 
congressional committees are able to secure a disproportionate share of federal funds for their 
districts. Yet the results of the present study offer evidence to the contrary. In aggregate tests of 
the distribution of new federal assistance and in dozens of demand-side estimations across 
federal agencies and bureaucratic divisions, this hypothesis finds little to no support. Instead, 
measures of district demand, variations in economic indicators, and select political factors like 
vote share, party, and ideology have far more predictive power than membership on 
jurisdictional congressional committees.  
 The findings in this study provide evidence that new federal assistance awards are not 
distributed based solely on political and intra-chamber factors, but on economic and geographic 
ones as well. The article’s test of Wagner’s Law of “increasing state activity” demonstrates that 
districts with higher incomes receive more aggregate funding, but fewer total awards. Such 
districts, then, receive larger awards on average. This could be due to the fact that districts with 
greater tax revenue also demand larger federal projects, though not necessarily more. A future 
analysis could include a more highly specified test of Wagner’s Law, in which the distribution of 
federal assistance is tested against various levels of income growth over time across a number of 
Congresses.  
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As a study of the distribution of new federal assistance awards during the 110th Congress 
in FY 2008, the findings herein are merely a snapshot of distributive effects. Federal assistance 
in the form of earmarks (Law and Tonon 2006; Boyle and Matheson 2009; Lazarus 2009 and 
2010) and contingent liabilities (Bickers and Stein 1996 and 2004; Lazarus and Reilly 2010) has 
also been tested and such tests should be applied to more recent Congresses. Moreover, Adler 
(2002) demonstrated that committee effects can vary widely across different agencies during 
multiple Congresses.  
The present study could be improved by adding federal awards for FY 2009 in order to 
capture the entire 110th Congress, in addition to including the prior, Republican-controlled 
House in order to search for more robust majority party effects. Future studies of pork 
distribution should also include a closer inspection of effects in the Senate (Lauderdale 2008 and 
Lazarus 2009). 
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